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The survey which is undertaken in this paper points to the
conclusion that for the purposes of law the conception of "person"
is a legal conception; put roughly, "person" signifies what law
makes it signify. If this conclusion had not been disputed, if it
were even now generally accepted, if even when it is accepted in
substance it were not complicated by the use of non-legal concepts
employed to justify certain reasonings and conclusions, this paper
would have no particular excuse for being written. For in that
case, being a legal concept, it would be one to be discussed by
lawyers rather than by a layman. Accordingly, the justification
for a layman venturing into the field is precisely the fact that dis-
cussions and theories which have influenced legal practice have,
with respect to the concept of "person," introduced and depended
upon a mass of non-legal considerations: considerations popular,
historical, political, moral, philosophical, metaphysical and, in
connection with the latter, theological., So many of these extra-
' Thus Geldart, an upholder of the doctrine of "real perzonality", says:
"The question is at bottom not one on which law and legal conceptions
have the only or the final voice: it is one which law shares with other
sciences, political science, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics". Geldart,
Legal Personality (1911) 27 L. QUART. Ruv. 90, at 94. On the next page
he goes on to assert that "To say that all legal personality-whether of
so-called natural or so-called juristic persons-is equally real because in
fact the law gives it an existence, and equally artificial or fictitious be-
cause it is only the law which gives it an existence, is really to confound
personality with capacity". But he makes no attempt to show the differ-
ence'between them, nor to state what harm would result in law if the two
were "confounded". That "artificial" is not synonymous with "fictitious"
is shown by Mlachen, Corporate Personality (1910) 24 HARv. L. REv. 253,
at 257: "That which is artificial is real, and not imaginary; an artificial
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neous influences have received a formulation in philosophy and
from thence have proceeded to affect legal doctrines that a stu-
dent of philosophy does not have to travel far beyond his own
field to discuss them.
As a starting point we may take the following statement from
Maitland, who has done so much to bring the question of the
nature of corporate legal personality to the attention of English
readers: "The corporation is (forgive this compound adjective)
a right-and-duty-bearing unit. Not all the legal propositions
that are true of a man will be true of a corporation. For exam-
ple, it can neither marry nor be given in marriage; but in a vast
number of cases you can make a legal statement about x and y
which will hold good whether these symbols stand for two men
or for two corporations, or for a corporation and a man." - In
saying that "person" might legally mean whatever the law makes
it mean, I am trying to say that "person" might be used simply
as a synonym for a right-and-duty-bearing unit. Any such unit
would be a person; such a statement would be truistic, tautologi-
cal. Hence it would convey no implications, except that the unit
has those rights and duties which the courts find it to have.
What "person" signifies in popular speech, or in psychology, or in
philosophy or morals, would be as irrelevant, to employ an exag-
gerated simile, as it would be to argue that because a wine is
called "dry," it has the properties of dry solids; or that, because
it does not have those properties, wine cannot possibly be "dry."
Obviously, "dry" as applied to a particular wine has the kind of
meaning, and only the kind of meaning, which it has when applied
to the class of beverages in general. Why should not the same
sort of thing hold of the use of "person" in law?
To take an illustration nearer to our theme, when the common
law refused to recognize any paternity for an illegitimate son, and
said he was filius nullius, it was not understood to deny the fact
of physiological begetting; it was asserting that such a one did
not possess the specific rights which belong to one who was
filius, implying wedlock as a legal institution. That filius sig-
lake is not an imaginary lake". Again he says: "A corporation cannot
be at the same time 'created by the state' and fictitious. If a corporation
is 'created' it is real, and therefore cannot be a purely fictitious body hav-
ing no existence except in the legal imagination". Much the same points
were made by Pollock. He says, that "artificial" means "in accordance
with rules of art, lawyer-like, juridical", and that "fiction" should be
derived from fingere in the sense of creating or making, not feigning.
Theory of Corporations in Common Law (1911) 27 L. QUART. REv. 219,
220, reprinted in Essays in the Law (1922) 153. Geldart's introduction
of the word "only" in the phrase "because it is only the law" is like saying
of a locomotive that "only" man gives it existence.
23 Maitland, Collected Papers (1911) 307. Throughout this paper,
"corporate" is used in its broad sense, of which a business corporation is
but a species and which includes bodies not technically incorporated.
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nifies a certain kind of heir, one implying a prior union of
man and woman authorized by law, is an example of a term
signifying what the system of rights and duties makes it signify.
To take another illustration still nearer our topic, suppose that
a number of married women, who, under common law suffered
from disability to contract, had formed a corporation. It may be
doubted whether even the most ardent disciple of the theory that
the association is nothing but the sum of its individual members
would infer that the corporation could not contract-although of
course it might have been denied that the women could form a
corporation. Admitting, however, the existence of the corpora-
tion, the right to contract would have been limited to the new rela-
tionship; because of it, the members of the corporation would
possess a right sui geieris. In a similar way, even if it were
true, as it is not, that "natural person" is a wholly unambiguous
term, to term a "natural" person a person in the legal sense is to
confer upon it a new, additive and distinctive meaning; a mean-
ing sui generis, as far as "natural person" is concerned.
If in justification of a particular decision in some particular
and difficult controversy, a court supports itself by appealing to
some prior properties of the antecedent non-legal "natural per-
son," the appeal may help out the particular decision; but it either
involves dependence upon non-legal theory, or else it extends the
legal concept of "natural person," or it does both. This state-
ment cuts in two ways. On the one hand, it indicates that much
of the difficulty attending the recent discussion of the real per-
sonality of corporate bodies is due to going outside the strictly
legal sphere, until legal issues have got complicated with other
theories, and with former states of scientific knowledge; and on
the other hand it suggests that law, at critical times and in deal-
ing with critical issues, has found it difficult to grow in any other
way than by taking over contemporary non-jural conceptiong
and doctrines. Just as the law has grown by taking unto itself
practices of antecedent non-legal status, so it has grown by tak-
ing unto itself from psychology or philosophy or what not extra-
neous dogmas and ideas. But just as continued growth with re-
spect to the former requires that law be again changed with great
changes in further practices, just as, to be specific, the adoption
of the law-merchant will not provide law adequate for the com-
plex industrial relations of today, so it is even more markedly
true that old non-legal doctrines which once served to advance
rules of law may be obstructive today. We often go on discuss-
ing problems in terms of old ideas when the solution of the prob-
lem depends upon getting rid of the old ideas, and putting in
their place concepts more in accord with the present state of ideas
and knowledge. The root difficulty in present controversies
about "natural" and associated bodies may be that while we
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oppose one to the other, or try to find some combining union of
the two, what we really need to do is to overhaul the doctrine of
personality which underlies both of them.
The purpose of the article is, in other words, to point out some
of the non-legal factors which have found their way into the dis-
cussion of the personality of so-called natural and artificial per-
sons, and to indicate the original conditions which gave these ex-
traneous factors their efficacy. The postulate, which has been
a controlling principle although usually made unconsciously, lead-
ing to the merging of popular and philosophical notions of the
person with the legal notion, is the conception that before any-
thing can be a jural person it must intrinsically possess certain
properties, the existence of which is necessary to constitute any-
thing a person. If the conception as to the nature of these in-
herent and essential attributes had remained constant perhaps no
harm would have resulted from shoving such a notion under the
legal idea; the legal doctrine would at least have remained as con-
stant as that of the nature of the seat of personality. But the
history of western culture shows a chameleon-like change in the
latter notion; this change has never, moreover, effected com-
plete replacement of an earlier by a later idea. Almost all con-
cepts have persisted side by side in a confused intermixture.
Hence their influence upon legal doctrine has necessarily been to
generate confusion and conflict.
We may illustrate by recourse to Maitland. The quotation above
made, taken apart from its context, would appear to use "person"
in a neutral sense, as signifying simply a right-and-duty-bear-
ing unit. But actually his discussion depends upon an assump-
tion that there are properties which any unit must antecedently
and inherently have in order to be a right-and-duty-bearing
unit. They are stated in his summary of Gierke's position, al-
though the statement is found in another book. A "universitas
[or corporate body] . . is a living organism and a real
person, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can
will, itself can act . . . it is a group-person, and its will is
a group-will." 3 I do not intend to imply that Maitland or Gierke
ever adopted all the extreme analogies with an "organism" into
his corporate unit, but a "will" he certainly thinks is presupposed
for being a legal person. In short, some generic or philosophic
concept of personality, that is, some concept expressing the in-
trinsic character of personality ueberhaupt, is implied. And here
is room for questions of general theory and the writing of many
books to show that legal units do or do not have the properties
required by the concept, and that "will" means this or that or the
other thing.
3 Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (1902) xxvi (translated
and prefaced by Maitland).
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Another example will make the implication more explicit.
Michoud says: "For legal science, the notion of person is and
should remain a purely juridical notion. The word signifies
simply a subject of rights-duties, [su jet de droit] a being capable
of having the subjective rights properly belonging to him."I
This sounds very much like saying "person" means what the law,
makes it mean in real distribution of rights and duties-although
the word "subjective" prefixed to rights might make wary one
who was acquainted with philosophical literature. But Michoud
at once goes on to say: "To know if certain beings correspond to
this definition, it is not necessary to ask if these beings consti-
tute persons in the philosophical sense of the word. It is enough
to ask if they are of such a vature that subjective rights may be
attributed to them". Considerations extraneous to law are here
nominally excluded, but they are actually taken in under the
guise of the necessity of inquiring into the nature of the subjects,
independently of and prior to the attribution of duty-rights. The
word "subject" inight have been used in legal theory simply as a
descriptive term, denoting whatever is a right-and-duty-bear-
ing unit. But in fact it has not been so used; it has been thought
necessary--especially in German theory which has spread-first
to define what makes anything properly a subject, as a precondi-
tion of having right-duties, and the German theory of "subjectiv-
ity" is itself a theme for volumes. This something-or-other must
then be the same in whatever has rights and duties. The readi-
est starting point is a singular man; hence there is imposed the
necessity of finding some nature or essence which belongs both
to men in the singular and to corporate bodies. If one denies
that he can find such a common essence he holds that "person"
as applied to corporate bodies denotes only a fiction. But if he
denies the fictitious character of a corporate entity, then some
personality identical in essence, or with respect to "subjectivity,"
must be discovered for all right-and-duty-bearing units, from thp
singular man on one side (including infants, born and unborn,
insane, etc.) to the state on the other, together with all kinds of
intervening corporate bodies such as "foundations," "associa-
tions" and corporations in the economic sense.5 Clearly, this is
not an easy task; it is so difficult of accomplishment that it ac-
counts in the main for the voluminous continental literature con-
cerning juridical personality, or as French writers generally say,
"Les Personnes Morales." But this is not the whole story.
4 Michoud, La Notion de PersonnalitN Moralc (1899) 11 REvLt Du DnOr
PUBLIC, 1, at 8.
The first of these terms have their doctrinal significance in Continental
rather than in Anglo-American law, the institution of trusteeship in the
latter covering much of the ground. The theory of "aZsociations" derived
much of its point in the past from controversies regarding the legal status
of religious congregations, to which is now added that of trade-unions.
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"Subject" and "subjectivity" occupy in modern German philoso-
phy (which directly and through writings on jurisprudence has
had an enormous influence in Latin countries and considerable in
England) the place taken in ancient metaphysics by "substance"
and also by "subject" of a judgment in a logical sense. Thus the
search for the common essence has been so affected by philo-
sophical theories regarding "the subject" that it is extremely dif-
ficult to get the full force of the various solutions proffered for
the problem without knowledge of German technical philosophy,
that of Kant in particular.
* It may be objected, however, that aside from all such philosoph-
ical theories regarding an "essence" or "nature" and regarding
a "subject," it is only common sense that whatever is a right-and-
duty-bearing unit should have a character of its own in virtue of
which it may possess rights-obligations; there must be a sub-
ject to which these legal relations belong or in which they inhere
or to which, at all events, they are imputed. Otherwise why are
not molecules, or trees or tables just as fit candidates for legal
attributes as singular men and corporate bodies? The objection
seems serious. But consider first an argument ad hominem, or
rather ad hoc. There is no general agreement regarding the na-
ture in se of the jural subject; courts and legislators do their work
without such agreement, sometimes without any conception or
theory at all regarding its nature; it can be shown that recourse
to some theory has more than once operated to hinder rather than
facilitate the adjudication of a special question of right or obliga-
tion. Moreover, English jurisprudence has accomplished by
means of "trust" much that Continental law has accomplished by
other means. One might then be justified in adopting a position
of legal agnosticism, holding that even if there be such an ulterior
subject per se, it is no concern of law, since courts can do their
work without respect to its nature, much less having to settle it.
It would, however, be retorted that such an attitude does not
become jurisprudence, that some theory is implied in the pro-
cedure of courts, and that the business of the theory of law is to
make explicit what is implied, particularly as false theories have
done practical harm, while the lack of intelligent consensus of
ideas has encouraged judicial empiricism, and thereby wrought
confusion, conflict and uncertainty in specific decisions. This
retort brings us to a deeper level. There are two radically differ-
ent types of definitions; first, the type inherited from Greek logic
reflecting a definite metaphysical conception regarding the
nature of things. This definition proceeds in terms of an essen-
tial and universal inhering nature. There is another mode of
definition which proceeds in terms of consequences. In brief, for
the latter a thing is-is defined as-what it does, "what-it-
does" being stated in terms of specific effects extrinsically
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wrought in other things. This logical method was first stated by
Charles S. Peirce as the pragmatistic rule: "Consider what ef-
fects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception
of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object".
The mode of definition, however, has no inherent dependence
upon pragmatism as a philosophy. It has been stated and
adopted on the basis of analysis of mathematics and physics by
writers who would be horrified to be called pragmatists. Thus
stated, it is the principle known as "extensive abstraction", and
assumes this form: ". . . what really matters to science is
not the inner nature of objects but their mutual relations, and
that any set of terms with the right mutual relations will answer
all scientific purposes as well as any other set with the same sort
of relations"."
From this point of view, the right-and-duty-bearing unit,
or subject, signifies whatever has consequences of a specified
kind. The reason that molecules or trees are not juridical "sub-
jects" is then clear; they do not display the specified conse-
quences. The definition of a legal subject is thus a legitimate,
and quite conceivably a practically important matter. But it is a
matter of analysis of facts, not of search for an inhering essence.
The facts in question are whatever specific consequences flow
from being right-and-duty-bearing units. This analysis is a
matter to be conducted by one competent in law, and not by the
layman. But even a layman can point out the field within which
the search falls. The consequences must be social in character,
and they must be such social consequences as are controlled and
modified by being the bearing of rights and obligations, privi-
leges and immunities. Molecules and trees certainly have social
consequences; but these consequences are what they are irrespec-
tive of having rights and duties. Molecules and trees would con-
tinue to behave exactly as they do whether or not rights and
duties were ascribed to them; their consequences would be vhat
they are anyway. But there are some things, bodies singular and
corporate, which clearly act differently, or have different conse-
quences, depending upon whether or not they possess rights and
duties, and according to what specific rights they possess and
what obligations are placed upon them. If the logical principle
6 Chance, Love and Logic (1923) 45, edited by Morris R. Cohen. The
original article was printed in the Popular Science Monthly for January,
1878.
7 Broad, Sce ntific Thought (1923) 39. The idea and the name are tahen,
however, by him from A. N. Whitehead. This is a more general state-
ment than Peirce's, because it applies to mathematical concepts, such as
"point", whose "consequences" are not physical effects. In concrete mat-
ters, the "mutual relations" which count are, however, of the nature of
effects.
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be granted, it is a factual matter what bodies have the speci-
fiable consequences and what these consequences are; but it be-
comes a verbal matter whether we call them all "persons", or
whether we call some of them persons and not others-or
whether we abandon the use of the word entirely.8
The general statement as to the type of definition demanded
may be made more specific by recurrence to Michoud. He finds
what he is in search of primarily in "interests". Now while he
had asserted the necessity of determining whether the beings who
are "persons" "are of such a nature that subjective rights may be
attributed to them", his conclusion that "interests" are primary
shifts the logical ground. For "interests", whatever else they
are or are not, .fall within the region of consequences, not of
"beings". It is true that he adds "will" as a secondary defining
element. Certain interests are protected by the rights and du-
ties of charitable foundations; but these interests are those of
recipients, who have no rights in the matter. Beings possessed
of will, administrators, are necessary as the organs of the inter-
est. His secondary mark or criterion may be said then to intro-
duce an inherent factor, that of "will". But our former logical
question recurs: Is "will" conceived or defined in terms of some-
thing intrinsic, or in terms of specifiable consequences? If the
former, then we are at once involved in all the controversies re-
garding the nature of will found in psychology and philosophy :-
there is no question upon which there is less consensus than upon
the nature of will.9 If the man of "common-sense" retorts,
"Away with these metaphysical subtleties; everybody knows well
8 English statutory law comes, in some respects, close to doing the latter
by its very generalization of the term "person". In (1833) 3 & 4 Win.
IV, c. 74, it is said: "The Word 'Person' shall extend to a Body Politic,
Corporate, or Collegiate, as well as an Individual". In the Interpretation
Act of 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, sec. 19, it is stated: "In this Act and
in every Act passed after the commencement of this Act the expression
'person' shall, unless the contrary intention appears, include any body of
persons corporate or unincorporate".
I owe the reference to Maitland, op. cit. supra note 2, at 401. He ex-
plains the the inclusion of "incorporate bodies" is probably due to the
desire to include some organs of local government, such as boards of
health, under their relevant legal rules. He adds: "It is not inconceiv-
able that the above cited section of the Act of 1889 may do some work
hereafter; but I have not heard of its having done any work as yet".
This statement indicates what is meant by the assertion that a generaliza-
tion of the term "person" may be equivalent to an abandonment of the
term, the work being done by specific statutes and judicial decisions bearing
upon specific matters.
9 One illustration, trivial in itself, but significant in what it stands for,
is the necessity the adherents of the "will" theory find themselves under,
of distinguishing volitions from volontd. Volitions may proceed from the
singular members of an association; volontM belongs to the association as
such. Saleilles, De la PersonalitM Juridique (1910) 565.
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enough the difference between a being with will and one without
one," his retort may be true for most cases; but it involves more
than "common-sense" is usually willing to aclmowledge: namely,
that "will" denotes certain empirically detectable and specifiable
consequences, and not a force or entity, psychological or meta-
physical. In other words, we determine the absence or presence
of "intent", and the kind of "intent", by discrimination among
concrete consequences, precisely as we determine "neglect",
which by definition is not a peculiar kind of inhering agency.
Neglect may, of course, be made into a positive and intrinsic force
or agency by hypostatization, but this is parallel to the procedure
of school-teachers who make a positive existential entity out of
"inattention". If we recur to the logical method of conception by
"extensive abstraction", "will", like "interests", denotes a fznc-
tion, not an intrinsic force or structure.'L
II
The foregoing section does not attempt to define what it is
to be a "person" in the sense of a right-and-duty-bearing unit.
Its purpose is to show the logical method by which such a defini-
tion should be arrived at; and, secondly, to show that the question
has been enormously complicated by the employment of a wrong
logical method, and by the introduction of irrelevant conceptions,
imported into legal discussion (and often into legal practice) from
1o It would require an article longer than this one merely to list and
describe various theories about will which, as held at one time or an-
other, have influenced legal doctrines. One reference must suffice. Pro-
fessor Pound has repeatedly shown how the conception of "will" was central
in the Roman law idea of legal transactions and how it affected the nine-
teenth century theory of contracts and related subjects. The entire post-
Kantian German concept of real personality is affected by the latter's
theory of will. 'Practically, the movement fell in with another, quite differ-
ent in character, which made "liberty" of will the central thing in order
to find a universal basis of political liberty-as with Rousseau. Subse-
quently, the German and French ideas flowed together, and the confluwc
was affected by the notion of economic liberty, which readily rationalized
itself by getting under the cover of the reigning theory of will. That the
idea assisted in promoting movements which were socially useful there
can be no doubt. To give one instance, Henderson has suggested its util-
ity in liberalizing the treatment of foreign corporations, which upon the
"concession" theory find the going very difficult. See Henderson, Position
of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (1918) 5.
Bly colleague, Professor H. W. Schneider, has called my attention to the
important influence exercised upon theories of the "real" legal personality
of corporate groups by the traditional association of the ideas of "agency",
"responsibility" and "guilt" with will. I have omitted discussion of this
point because its importance would demand an entire paper, at least, for
adequate treatment. I would only suggest that the grouping of these
ideas together is at present a matter of historic interest, but is unnecessary
from the standpoint of contemporary thought.
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uncritical popular beliefs, from psychology, and from a metaphys-
ics ultimately derived from theology. It is not intended, how-
ever, to imply that these extraneous considerations have not been
historically significant, nor that the causes of their emergence into
law is not of importance for legal history. The reverse is the
case. To the student, and not merely the historical student, of
human culture, they afford a fascinating, if intricate, field of in-
quiry; and the history and present status of legal institutions is
involved in this study of human culture. The sources, career and
effects of the conceptions of "intent" and of "malicious" intent
would alone lay bare an instructive cross-section of the whole
history of religion, morals and psychology. Of more direct sig-
nificance for our special theme is the fact that the underlying con-
troversies and their introduction into legal theory and actual
legal relations, express struggles and movements of immense
social import, economic and political. Such a formal or logical
analysis as we have been engaged in is in fact but preliminary.
What is back of these factors which are logically extraneous?
What vital issues have led to their getting so thoroughly mixed up
with questions of legal definition? To answer this question is
to engage in a survey of the conflict of church and empire in the
middle ages; the conflict of rising national states with the medie-
val Roman empire; the struggle between dynastic and popular
representative forms of government; the conflict between feudal
institutions, ecclesiastic and agrarian, and the economic needs pro-
duced by the industrial revolution and the development of na-
tional territorial states; the conflict of the "proletariat" with the
employing and capitalist class; the struggle between nationalism
and internationalism, or trans-national relations, to mention only
a few outstanding movements. 1 These conflicts are primarily
political and economic in nature. But there is not one of them
which has not left its profound impress upon the law, including
11 Since the last-named topic will not concern us further, one illustration
may be mentioned. One potent recent motive for the insistence upon the
real "personality" of social groups, or corporate bodies, independent of the
state, is opposition to the claim that the state is the sole or even supreme
Person. The latter notion reflects the increase of importance of the na-
tional territorial state. Opposition from the side we are alluding to, is
due to the fact that the doctrine of the ultimate personality of these states
finds fitting expression in wars. Moreover, these wars confer upon the
states too unrestricted power over their citizens, and also unfavorably affect
the complex economic interdependences wrought by modern methods of
industry and commerce. In an article written before the war, Lindsay
rightly cites Norman Angell as a factor "in the newest political gospel"
which "makes open and declared war against the doctrine that the State
is a personality". This attack is inspired "not by a belief in the isolation
of individuals, but by a perception that the co-operation of individuals and
their common dependence on one another extends beyond the bounds of
the State." Lindsay, The State in Recent Political Theory (1914) 1
POLITIcAL QUARTERLY, 128, at 130 and 132.
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particularly the doctrines of the nature and seat of juridical per-
sonality. Discussions and concepts may have been in form intel-
lectual, using a full arsenal of dialectical weapons; they have been
in fact, where they have any importance, "rationalizations" of the
positions and claims of some party to a struggle. It is this fact
which gives such extraordinary interest to the history of doc-
trines of juridical personality. Add to this fact that the intellec-
tual and scientific history of western Europe is reflected in the
changing fortunes of the meanings of "person" and "personal-
ity", a history which has both affected and been affected by the
social struggles, and the interest and complexity of the doctrines
about juridical personality are sufficiently obvious.
For example, the "fiction" theory of the personality of corporate
bodies, or uwdversitates, was promulgated if not originated, by
Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254. St. Thomas Aquinas died in
1274). It is hardly a coincidence that Pope Innocent was one
of the strongest upholders of the supremacy of the spiritual over
the temporal power, and that he was Pope immediately after the
time of the greatest political power of the Papal Empire.2 In
outward form the doctrine that corporate bodies are pcr;qona
fictae was directed at ecclesiastic bodies. The doctrine was stated
as the reason why an ecclesiatic collegivin or univur "Ites, or
ccpitzdur could not be excommunicated, or be guilty of a delict.
For mo ina sunt juris et non pcrisonarun; they have neither a
body nor a will. A chapter was but a name and an incorporeal
res. Other canonists declared that corporate bodies could not be
punished or excommunicated because they had neither a soul nor
a body, and carried their nominalism so far as to say that they
had being only in abstracto, like "man" in respect to men. The
doctrine did not imply, however, that excommunication was of no
effect; on the contrary, it signified that, in order that a decree of
punishment or excommunication should not lack effect, it was to
be applied to all, ontizes shigi4os. Even if Pope Innocent had not
included populus et genzs et hzuji's nodi along with ecclesiastical
groups (we cannot call them bodies on his theory), we may be
sure that what applied to religious organizations applied a fortiori
to civil. A chapter or a popiztis regarded as an entity would not
suffer especially from exconmmunication; it was wholly different
when the ban fell upon "omnes shig.!os".13 The intellectual
120 f a not far remote predecessor, it is said that "The fully rounded
ecclesiastic theory, at the climax of actual ecclesiastic power, is to be
found in the writings of Pope Innocent III (pontificate 119C-1216)."
Dunning, Political Theories, Ancict anzd Mcdiacral (1902) 162, 160.
12 I have relied upon Gierke for the references (3 Das dcutchcs Gcnoscn-
schaftrecht, 279-285.) Gierke says that Pope Innocent IV "was the father
of the dogma of the purely fictitious and intellectual character of juridical
persons which still rules". Even if this statement were not literally cor-
rect the reference would be of great importance because of the currency
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factor in the doctrine takes us to the fact that being a "person"
was deniea to these groups because of the dominant conception
of person. The current idea is expressed in the definition of
St. Thomas Aquinas, vera persona est rei rationabilis individua
substantia. In this definition every one of the three last words
has a technical meaning going back to the metaphysical discus-
sions of Aristotle; the problem of the nature of the "individual"
being, indeed, for the middle age philosophers, even more of a
problem than that of "substance", which had been decided once
for 'all by Aristotle. 14  The consequences of including "rational
individuated substance" in the conception of "person" endured
long after the metaphysics and theology which gave it birth were
obscured if not forgotten; and they account for much of the dif-
ficulty in even recent discussion in attributing "person" to corpo-
rate as well as to single units.
The "concession" theory of juridical persons, while often con-
fused with the "fiction" theory, had a different origin, and testifies
to quite a different situation of conflict of interests. It is es-
sentially a product of the rise of the national state, with its
centralizing tendencies and its objection to imperia in. imperio
at a time when religious congregations and organizations of
feudal origin (communes and guilds) were rivals of the claim of
the national state to complete sovereignty. The shortest cut to
making good its claims was to treat all minor organizations as
"conjurations" and conspiracies, except as they derived all their
powers from an express grant of a supreme power, the State.
Certain classes were as much interested in magnifying the gov-
ernment and regulation by statute law as Pope Innocent III was
in magnifying the authority and power of the Papacy. The
choice of the word "concession" was probably influenced by
Roman law.'-
Maitland gave to the discussion and to Gierke, and because of the influence
of Maitland upon Laski, one of the chief modern propounders of the doc-
trine that organized groups have personality independent of, and in many
cases prior to, state action.
14 We are far away from the Latin persona which when applied to a man
in the concrete hardly meant more than a separate physical body. f1he
change in meaning was undoubtedly of theological origin, the term "per-
sona" having been applied by the fathers (first I believe by Tertullian) to
the hyspostases of the Trinity.
25 Gaius, Digest, III, 4, 1. In all events, it is suggestive that the state-
ments of Gaius were made at a time (161 A. D.) when the Empire was in
full centralizing course. It should be noted, however, that Gaius is not
referring explicitly to anything he calls persons. His point is that being
a universitas or collegium. is something dependent upon statutes, sensatzes
consulZta and imperial constitutions. It is interesting, moreover, to note
in connection with the efforts to bring Roman ideas into the whole con-
troversy that Maitland expressly says that "The admission must be made
that there is no text which directly calls the universitas a persona, and
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In lieu of an extended discussion of the practical motivation
of the basic ideas of the concession theory, I shall give one quota-
tion. "In its various forms of ecclesiastical bodies and founda-
tions, gilds, municipalities, trading companies, or business organ-
izations, the corporation has always presented the same problem
of how to check the tendency of group action to undermine
the liberty of the individual or to rival the political power of the
state. The somewhat vague theory of the later Middle Ages
that communal organization not sanctioned by prescription or
royal license was illegal was at least from the fifteenth century
on supplemented by the technical doctrine, developed under
canonist influences, that there is no capacity to act as a body
corporate without positive authorization. To grant this author-
ity has remained in England an attribute of the royal preroga-
tive. . . . It is hardly possible to overestimate the theory
that corporate existence depends on positive sanction as a factor
in public and legislative policy. It is natural that the charter
or incorporation law should be made the vehicle of restraints or
regulations which might not be readily imposed upon natural
persons acting on their own initiative, and the course of legis-
lative history bears this out." 10
It is clear that there is nothing essentially in common between
the fiction and concession theories, although they both aimed
toward the same general consequence, as far as limitation of
power of corporate bodies is concerned. The fiction theory is
ultimately a philosophical theory that the corporate body is but
a name, a thing of the intellect; the concession theory may be
indifferent as to the question of the reality of a corporate body;
what it mzt insist upon is that its legal power is derived. In
some respects, the concession theory is the more favorable to
expanded power of corporations; a charter of broad powers might
be granted and the courts might construe its terms liberally. Its
conceded assimilation to the singular person, even when a
still less any that calls it persona ficta." Gierke (with preface by Mait-
land), supra note 3, at xviii.
26 Freund, Standards of American Legislation (1917) 39. The quotation
continues by indicating the restraints imposed on banking and insurance
corporations, railways and express companies. Historically, the restrictive
attitude towards at least business corporations finds its explanation and
justification in the fact that they were few and exceptional, being usually
huge trading companies, actually and often nominally, monopolic, whore
"rights" were privileges and immunities. As so often happened, .vordo,
with associated ideas and temper of mind, persisted after corporations had
become commonplace and, indeed, the usual means of carrying on busines.
Henderson, in the work already referred to, has shown the effet of povzc-s-
sion of extraordinary privileges by early corporations in creating fear of
them and the extent to which this fear influenced court decisions, as for
example, that in the case of The Bank of tle United States v. Dcvca,,:.,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 19, 55, 56.
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corporation is called "artificial", might even enlarge its rights,
privileges and immunities. In an "individualistic" period-that
is, an era chiefly concerned with rights of private property and
contract-it is pretty sure to do so. Consider, for example, the
court decisions that a business corporation is a "person" in the
sense covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the effects of
this decision. On the other hand, the fiction theory that a corpo-
ration having no soul cannot be guilty of delict gives a corpora-
tion considerable room in which to manoeuvre. Thus we cannot
say, without qualification in respecting time and conditions, that
either theory works out in the direction of limitation of corporate
power.1
7
In spite of their historical and logical divergence, the two
theories flowed together. Their conflux and its result is ex-
hibited in many decisions of American judges. The practical
key to the union, in which the feigned theory on the whole got
the better of the concession theory, resides in the allusion just
made to an "individualistic" age. When it is difficult to lay
hands on the single persons who are said to be the only "real"
persons, it is very convenient to do business as a fiction. With
respect to its property, the fictitious entity has a clear title as an
entity; with respect to its liabilities and burdens outside of
property and contract, its position is not so clear; its fictitious
character 'may be cited to relieve it of some obligations usually
regarded as moral, and yet legally enforceable as regards single
persons. Pope Innocent IV was under no such difficulty. Ex-
communication could reach down to every part of the aggregate
whole; it is not so easy to reach the fluctuating "real" persons
who form that "merely collective aggregate", the share-holders
in a joint-stock company, especially if they are "widows and
orphans". To a considerable extent, the corporation has "had it
both ways" when the corporation was regarded as nothing but
a name for an aggregate or collection of real persons. Adequately
to develop this fact and the reasons for it would require an ex-
cursion into the change which took place in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in the concept of the "singular person", now
become the full-fledged individual in his own right. The ex-
17 Imaginary beings or fictions may not only gain privileges because of
the absence of souls, but because of the unlimited elasticity of fictions.
As Machen says, "If the corporate personality is imaginary, there is no
limit to the characteristics and capacities which may be attributed to that
p-ersonality. . . . If you can imagine a corporate entity is a person,
you can also imagine that this person has a mind". Machen, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 347, 348. The "fiction theory", if it had been separated wholly
from the "concession theory", might have lent itself to liberalizing the theory
of foreign corporations. Difficulties regarding "residence" and "migration"
might easily have been got over; for imaginary creatures are notoriously
nimble.
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cursion cannot be undertaken. Suffice it to say that the single
person, as the "real person", is no longer either a physical body
or a rational substance. These two meanings persist, but they
are covered up with vestments derived from the theory of natural
rights inhering in individual persons as such. The contrast of
"natural" and "artificial" persons got its point from the fact that
"natural" connoted possession of inherent and inviolable rights.
The dialectic of the courts, under the pressure of social facts,
was equal to declaring that corporations, while artificial and
fictitious, nevertheless had all the natural rights of an individual
person, since after all they were legal persons.
Perhaps a reader may infer that the foregoing amounts to a
plea for the "real" personality of corporate bodies. Recurrence
to the introductory remarks should, however, dissipate this im-
pression. As far as the historical survey implies a plea for any-
thing, it is a plea for disengaging specific issues and disputes
which arise from entanglement with any concept of personality
which is other than a restatement that such and such rights and
duties, benefits and burdens, accrue and are to be maintained and
distributed in such and such ways, and in such and such situations.
I
The fact of the case is that there is no clear-cut line, logical or
practical, through the different theories which have been ad-
vanced and which are still advanced in behalf of the "real" per-
sonality of either "naturaF or associated persons. Each theory
has been used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to
serve opposing ends. The doctrine of the personality of the state
has been advanced to place the state above legal responsibility
on the ground that such a person has no superior person-save
God-to whom to answer; and in behalf of a doctrine of the
responsibility of the state and its officers to law, since to be a
person is to have legal powers and duties. The personality of
the state has been opposed to both the personality of "natural"
singular persons and to the personality of groups. In the latter
connection it has been employed both to make the state the
supreme and culminating personality in a hierarchy, to make it
but prinus inter paros, and to reduce it to merely one among
many, sometimes more important than others and sometimes less
so. These are political rather than legal considerations, but they
have affected law. In legal doctrines proper, both theories have
been upheld for the same purpose, and each for opposed ends.
Corporate groups less than the state have had real personality
ascribed to them, both in order to make them more amenable to
liability, as in the case of trade-unions, and to exalt their dignity
and vital power, as against external control. Their personality
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has been denied for like reasons; they have been pulverized into
mere aggregates of separate persons in order to protect other
laborers from them, to make more difficult their unified action in
trade disputes, as in collective bargaining, and to enable union
property to escape liability, the associated individuals in their
severalty having no property to levy upon. The group person-
ality theory has been asserted both as a check upon what was
regarded as anarchic and dissolving individualism, to set up
something more abiding and worthful than a single human being,
and to increase the power and dignity of the single being as over
against the state. Even the doctrine that true personality re-
sides only in the "natural" person has been worked in opposed
directions. It was first used to give church or state a short and
direct road of approach which would lessen the power of the
singular being over against the collective being, while lately,
through being affected by "natural" in the sense of natural rights,
it has been employed to exalt private, at the expense of public,
interests.
Unfortunately, the human mind tends toward fusion rather
than discrimination, and the result is confusion. I quote at
length from a recent writer: "A position intermediate between
the biological and the psychological theories of the state is held
by Gierke and Maitland, whose point of view is shared by such
writers as Figgis, Laski and Duguit. The founder of this posi-
tion was the German jurist, Johannes Althusius. . . . His
theory of the state as a hierarchy of constituent groups was
broadened out by his modern interpreter, Otto Gierke, in his
Genossenschaftslehre, which was sponsored and clarified by the
eminent English historian and jurist, F. W. Maitland. Briefly,
the doctrine is that the state is not a collection of individuals but
an aggregation of groups. These groups, in turn, are not merely
a plural number of individuals, but an organization of individuals
designed to achieve a definite purpose. As purposive groups
they are psychic organisms, possessing not a fictitious but a real
psychic personality. . . . The exponents of this doctrine of
the reality.and significance of the group range in their interpreta-
tion of the place and significance of the state all the way from the
position of such writers as Ernest Barker, who supports an Aris-
totelian-Hegelian adulation of the state, to the extreme pluralists
and the Syndicalists, who would eliminate the state altogether."''
The author is writing from the political point of view, not the
legal; and the last sentence makes allowance for divergence of
views as to the place of the state. But the passage gives the
impression of a single school, coherent in its premises if not in
its political conclusions. Analysis of the account, therefore, is
not just for the sake of convicting Mr. Barnes of error, but for
is Barnes, Sociology and Political Theory (1924) 29-30.
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the sake of revealing the fate of any conception that, by ignoring
context and purpose, tries to introduce unity into a conception
where the facts show utmost divergence. There is a forced as-
semblage of persons. Laski, like Althusius, has a political inter-
est; but the political interest of the former was to afford a basis
for popular government, while that of Laski was to moralize the
idea of the state, to attack the idea of irresponsible sovereignty,
and, under the influence of the pluralistic philosophy of James,
to utilize the importance of the group, assumed currently in the
sociology of the period, to dwell upon the vitality and autonomy
of group interests. Althusius, on the other hand, in the latter,
in contracting themselves into the state, lost their autonomous
standing with respect to it.' The interest of Figgis in group-
personality appears to be wholly conditioned upon his desire to
preserve the autonomy of ecclesiastic organizations, especially
that of the Church of England. 0
19 His (Laski's) article on Pe;,soiality of Associotions closes with a sec-
tion introduced by these words: "If what we have here been urging is
true, it reacts most forcibly upon our theory of the state. Thus far, for
the most part, we have sought its unification. We have made it intolerant
of associations within itself-associations that to Hobbes will appear com-
parable only to 'worms within the entrails of a natural man'. As a result
we have made our state absorptive in a mystic, Hegelian fashion. It is
all-sovereign and unchallengeable. . . . But sovereign your state no
longer is if the groups within itself are thus self-governing. Nor can we
doubt this polyarchism. Everyvhere we find groups within the state which
challenge its supremacy. They are, it may be, in relations with the state,
a part of it; but one with it they are not. They refuse the reduction to
unity. We find the state, in James' phrase, to be distributive and not
collective". Foundations of Sovereignty (1921) 163-169, originally printed
in (1916) 29 HAne. L. REV. 404. The statements about the relation of
groups and the state may be true, historically, sociologically and ethically.
But they are an argument for the volitional personality of these associa-
tions only on the theory that the state is also a personal unified will. It
was not the Hobbessian theory, or any similar theory, which produced the
magnification of the state; the centralizing tendencies of the new national
state produced the theory. Similarly, the rising social, economic and
political importance of associations is producing, in analogy with the con-
cept of the older theory of the state, a theory of their metaphysical per-
sonality. One can get the same practical results with a theory like Duguits,
which denies not only the personality of both state and groups but also of
the natural individual, as a substratum of rights-duties. "Public law has
become objective just as private law is no longer based on individual right
or the autonomy of a private will, but upon the idea of a social function
imposed on every person". Duguit, Law in tha Modern State (1919, trans-
lated by Laski) 49. Again, "In private law the autonomy of the human
will is in process of disappearance; the individual will is powerless by itself
to create a legal situation." Duguit, supra at 243.
20 It is interesting to note, as an instance of the particular and "prag-
matic" origin of much of the English theorizing, the large part played by
the case of the Free Church of Scotland v. O'crtown [1904] A. 0. 515, and
of the trades unions decisions in the Taff Vale case [1901] A. C. 42G and
the Osborne case [1910] A. C. 87. For the former see Vinagradoff,
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Gierke's interest was primarily legal; he wrote at a time when
no German writer of influence would have thought of depreciat-
ing the personality of the state; that was taken for granted. The
practical issue was found in the quarrel between Romanists and
Germanists; Savigny the great Romanist had come out for the
persona fict theory of corporate bodies. Gierke wrote as a Ger-
manist to oppose him, and the quarrel found its practical bearing
in the fact that the German Civil Code was being drawn. Mait-
land writes primarily as a historian of legal institutions, although
his political interest is sufficient to make him remark that "the
State's possession of a real will is insecure if no other groups may
have wills of their own". 2' While he leans toward the real per-
sonality theory, it is safe to say that he is mt~ch more interested
in a comparison of German and English theories and practices
than he is in any theory; and any one interested in denying the
theory can find much material in the rich store Maitland pro-
vides.22  Duguit writes as a lawyer, and his political interest is
in making the "state", all officers of government legally liable,
He denies will and personality to both the state and all other
groups. "Nor is it [fault] imputable to the collectivity since the
latter outside the imagination of lawyers has no personal ex-
istence".23 As for Ernest Barker, he is indeed strong for the
personality of the state, but his purpose is identical with that
of Duguit, who denies precisely what Barker asserts: "What
is needed is, in the first place, the conception of the State or
the Public as a legally responsible person; and, in the second
place, the application to this person of the idea of agency in such
sort that it shall admit responsibility for the acts of its servants
done in its service." 24 Specifically he wants some kind of ad-
ministrative and law courts, in which the state through its agents,
Juridical Persons (1924) 24 COL. L. REy. 594, at 597-599. Laski, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 165-166 has a few comments on the latter two cases.
There is a strange logic implied in the reasonings of the "real group per-
sonality" school that, since unwise decisions have been reached in a num-
ber of cases under cover of the "fictitious person" theory, the "real per-
sonality" view must be necessary to reach a correct decision. There is
surely more than one omitted alternative possibility.
21 Gierke (with preface by Maitland), op. cit. supra note 3, at xlii.
22 Thus his whole discussion of trusts shows how much has been accom-
plished, avoiding some of the attending difficulties of German law, "without
troubling the state to concede or deny the mysterious boon of personality."
3 Collected Papers 283. His remark that "it's often struck me that morally
there is most personality where legally there is least" certainly cuts both
ways. The fact that the family, which is the most intimate emotional and
volitional unity, is not a jural personality, has given the adherents of
the real personality theory much difficulty.
23 Duguit, Law in the Modern State (1919) 205.
24 Barker, The 'Rule of Law' (May, 1914) THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY,
117, at 123. For a full discussion of this matter see Borchard, Gozern-
'ment Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 1, 129, 229.
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can be rendered liable, although not administrative law of the
French type. Finally, the reference to "psychic organisms" is
either gratuitous or highly misleading. It is not psychic person-
ality which these writers-as far as they do hold to the personal-
ity of the state-are concerned with, but a moral personality,
that is unity of organized action involving "will". The idea of
psychic personality is read in from writers on social psychology
and sociology.
I do not make this examination for the sake of indicating that
Mr. Barnes sins above others. As already said, the collection of
commissions and omissions is the sort of thing which is bound
to happen when one assumes that there is in existence some single
and coherent theory of personality and will, singular or asso-
ciated. Nothing accurate or intelligible can be said except by
specifying the interest and purpose of a writer, and his historical
context of problems and issues. Thus we end where we began:
with the statement that the entire discussion of personality,
whether of single or corporate personality, is needlessly encum-
bered with a mass of traditional doctrines and remnants of old
issues. Almost every- English writer, beginning with Maitland,
who has written in behalf of the doctrine of the "real personality"
of corporate bodies, has felt obliged to quote the following from
Dicey: "When a body of twenty or two thousand or two hun-
dred thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular
way for some common purpose, they create a body which by no
fiction of law but by the very nature of things, differs from the
individuals of whom it is composed." Assuredly; but why should
such a fact be thought to have any bearing at all upon the prob-
lem of personality? Only because the doctrine of "fictitious"
personality has been employed, under the influence of the "in-
dividualistic" philosophy already referred to, in order to deny
that there is any social reality at all back of or in corporate ac-
tion. Hence the assertion of the simple fact that there is some
social reality involved got bound up with the notion of a real,
as distinct from fictitious personality. The example, it seems to
me, is sufficiently striking to enforce the value of eliminating the
idea of personality until the concrete facts and relations involved
have been faced and stated on their own account: retaining the
word will then do no great harm.
